New competition, state-aid and governance rules threaten old assumptions about bailouts, board appointments and privileged contracts.
In Montenegro, the state can be a shareholder, regulator, lender, customer and rescuer of the same corporate sector. EU accession is beginning to separate those roles — at least on paper.
The negotiating chapter on competition policy was provisionally closed in July 2026 after Montenegro adopted a broader antitrust and merger-control framework. The Agency for Protection of Competition can use interim measures, accept commitments and seek periodic penalties. A separate law gives companies and consumers a route to damages after competition infringements. The 2025 state-aid law strengthens scrutiny before and after support is granted and provides for the recovery of unlawful aid.
For private investors, these changes matter more than another accession ceremony. They determine whether an efficient company can challenge a politically connected rival, whether an acquisition receives a credible review and whether a state-owned business can underprice risk because taxpayers stand behind it.
The airline test
The hardest questions arrive when a public company fails. EU scrutiny of support granted to Montenegro Airlines, and of the possible economic continuity between the collapsed carrier and ToMontenegro, which trades as Air Montenegro, shows why. A new legal entity does not necessarily erase an old state-aid liability if the business, assets and economic activity continue.
A new company name cannot be assumed to erase an old state-aid problem.
That principle reaches beyond aviation. It limits the government’s ability to recapitalise, transfer assets or create a successor around an insolvent state business without examining the market terms. It also changes due diligence for lenders and commercial partners: a contract with a new public company may still carry the history of the entity it replaced.
Wizz Air’s new Podgorica base sharpens the test. The low-cost entrant can deploy aircraft across a regional network and judge routes commercially. Air Montenegro must meet a public-connectivity mandate while demonstrating that support and contracts comply with EU rules. Airports of Montenegro, another state-owned group, sits between them as infrastructure provider and commercial counterparty.
Boards move from patronage to performance
Parliament’s June 2026 law on state-owned companies is intended to create a common ownership framework, coordinated by the finance ministry. It introduces public competitions and competence criteria for board members, measurable objectives and performance monitoring. The legislation draws on OECD principles and is designed to make ownership policy more coherent across the portfolio.
EPCG, Airports of Montenegro, Port of Bar, Air Montenegro and other public groups will reveal whether the reform has teeth. Transparent recruitment can be imitated while informal political influence survives. Performance targets can be written so loosely that failure has no consequence. The real test is whether boards can reject uneconomic instructions, disclose related-party risks and replace managers who miss agreed objectives.
For lenders and minority investors, credible governance could lower risk. For political parties, it threatens a channel of appointments and influence. For incumbent managers, it replaces relationships with evidence. The law is therefore more than an administrative tidying exercise; it reallocates power inside the public sector.
Procurement cannot run on two tracks
Public procurement was equivalent to 11.38 per cent of Montenegro’s GDP in 2024. E-procurement and closer alignment with EU procedures should widen the field for engineering contractors, technology suppliers, consultants and service companies. Transparent evaluation also makes tender pipelines easier to finance because bidders can estimate process risk more rationally.
But the European Commission has identified an awkward exception. A 2025 tourism and property agreement with the United Arab Emirates exempted related contracts from the procurement law, creating a risk of circumventing the acquis. The issue is not whether Gulf capital is welcome; it is whether strategically favoured capital receives a different rulebook.
A two-track market would undermine the entire reform. Ordinary bidders would bear the cost of EU-style compliance while designated projects proceeded through bilateral political arrangements. Connected domestic suppliers would retain an advantage, and serious international contractors would price the uncertainty into bids or stay away.
Enforcement decides the winners
The new rules threaten companies whose economics depend on bailouts, opaque contracts or protected positions. They favour efficient private entrants, professional advisers and public companies able to prove that decisions are commercial. But legislation alone cannot create that outcome.
The competition agency needs staff, data and the confidence to investigate influential groups. Courts must process fines and damages claims predictably. Ministries must notify aid before money moves, not rationalise it afterwards. Procurement systems need red flags that identify collusion and conflicts rather than simply digitising paperwork.
Montenegro has provisionally closed the competition chapter. Its corporate sector has only begun the examination. The credibility of accession will be measured in cases where the government has an incentive to bend its own rules — and chooses not to.Elevated by Mercosur.me